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mineworker mortality:
Witwatersrand and the Copperbelt,
1911-1940
Bruce Fetter
1 Comparison of the changing causes of death in two of Industrial Africa's largest mining
companies can indicate both characteristics of the protean work forces and differences in
company medical policies. Both the Corner House Group on the Witwatersrand and the
Union Minière in what was then Katanga were reticent in reporting both mortality levels
among their African workers and on causes of death. This essay will explore statistical
data provided in some relatively obscure publications which throw additional light on the
health consequences of early stages of the industrialization process in Africa.
2 In both South Africa and what is today Zaïre, large scale mining began in the absence of a
labor market.  European-managed mining companies therefore had the double task of
finding workers and persuading them to stay on the job. In the early years managements
depended for labor on constraint applied either directly by labor touts or indirectly by
colonial  governments  which  imposed  taxes  on  African  populations  payable  only  in
European money. Even then, certain potential sources were excluded because of political
considerations. In South Africa, objections by European miners and politicians resulted in
the elimination of Chinese workers after 1907, and those of British officials in Central
Africa led to bans on the recruitment of "tropical" Africans between 1912 and 19331.
Similarly, Belgian officials beginning in 1926 restricted recruitment for the copper mines
to the Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi2.
3 Once  workers  were  found,  managers  had  to  assure  working  and  living  conditions
conductive to production. Africans responded eagerly to monetary incentives, but they
also  had  to  be  kept  in  good  health  in  order  to  maximize  their  productivity.  The
development of the mineral industry in Africa after 1900 depended on recent advances in
tropical hygiene made in other parts of the world. New institutes of tropical medicine in
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London,  Liverpool,  Brussels  (later  Antwerp),  and  Hamburg  analyzed  tropical  micro-
organisms and the vectors which transmitted them. Military physicians and engineers
applied many of these advances to tropical conditions for both warfare and public works.
The best-known of these tropical hygienists was Colonel (later Surgeon-General) William
C. Gorgas who supervised sanitary activities at the construction of the Panama Canal.
Under  daunting  conditions  which  had  led  an  earlier  French  group  to  abandon
construction, Gorgas established a set of procedures which sharply reduced mortality
from both  tropical  and global  diseases  which had decimated  workers  on  the  earlier
project3.
4 Late in 1913 the Chamber of Mines invited Gorgas to South Africa as a consultant to make
recommendations for improving conditions for its work force. Upon his return to the
United States, Gorgas produced an elaborate report which proved unacceptable to both
the South African government and to the top management of the mining industry4. The
most important sticking points were his recommendations to allow African miners to live
at the mine sites with their wives and children and to centralize the provision of hospital
care among mines of different ownership5. Despite the rejection of these suggestions, the
management of the largest mining consortium, the Corner House Group, asked Gorgas to
recommend a director for their health services. He submitted the name of a protégé from
his Panama days, Dr. Alexander Orenstein, who moved to South Africa where he spent a
long career.
5 Through Orenstein, Gorgas's influence also reached the Katanga mines. Shortly after the
First World War, Dr. A. Boigelot of the colonial health service visited South Africa to see
how South African companies, led by the Corner House Group, were reducing mortality
rates on the mines6. His account of his visit led the Union Minière to invite Orenstein to
Katanga  as  a  consultant.  Although  Orenstein's  mandate  was  limited  to  anti-malarial
measures,  he  also  made  suggestions  for  changes  in  African  housing  facilities  and
undoubtedly to spoke to his Belgian hosts about Gorgas's original recommendations for
South Africa7. Union Minière managers, unhindered by settler politicians or an effective
white trade union movement, eventually (1926) adopted his stabilization of labor policy,
which called for the implantation of workers with their families8.
6 The  managements  of  the  Corner  House  Group  and  the  Union  Minière  shared  many
common concerns  while  operating  in  rather  different  political  environments.  I  have
earlier argued that these political differences were a major determinant of differences in
worker health9. Let us now look at statistics relating to the mortality of the respective
worker populations to see whether that argument can be sustained.
7 Neither company was eager to publicize statistics relating to the health of its workers.
Although internal documents discussed the matter frankly, managers felt they might be
compromised by the high levels of mortality. The Union Minière, however, was subject to
outside  political  pressures.  During  the  mid-twenties,  a  number  of  colonial  agencies
including the government felt they were in competition for a limited number of African
workers. As a result, mortality statistics for various employers were reported in annual
government  reports  to  the  Belgian  Parliament.  By  the  early  thirties,  Union  Minière
managers were justly proud of their achievements and lost their reluctance to publicize
conditions in the camps. From that point onward, mine physicians such as Robert van
Nitsen  and  representatives  of  the  company's  Native  Labor  Service,  led  by  Léopold
Mottoulle, eagerly presented the latest statistics10. It was not until the Second World War,
however, that cause of death statistics for the early years were analyzed by Dr. Robert
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Mouchet  in  a  paper  given  during  the  German  occupation  to  the  Royal  Academy  of
Colonial Sciences11.
 
Table 1: Crude death rates at corner house and the union miniere
Sources: Corner House: Gorgas Papers, W.S. Hoole Special Collection, University of Alabama Library; 
Report on Nyasaland Natives in the Union of South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia (Zomba, 1937); Rand
Mines Annual Report 1964. Union Minière – Service Médical, Rapports annuels, 1930.
8 Corner House managers were even more tight-lipped than those of the Union Minière.
Some statistics were reported at the time of Gorgas's mission just before the First World
War, but for the next twenty years, little seems to have been available in periodicals such
as  the South  African Medical  Journal  and the Proceedings  of  the  (Transvaal)  Mine  Medical
Officers' Association. Orenstein broke the silence in a report to the Third Empire Mining
and Metallurgical Congress in 1930, divulging mortality levels and changing causes of
death  among  Corner  House  Group  employees  for  the  years  1911  and  1928  without
providing statistics for the years in between12. Those appeared only in the mid-thirties
when the company was trying to convince British administrators in what is now Malawi
to allow the resumption of recruitment for the gold mines. In 1937, the Corner House
Group  revealed  annual  figures  for  Crude  Death  Rates,  pneumonia,  tuberculosis,  and
accidents in the form of a semi-logarithmic graph presented to John C. Abraham, the
Senior Provincial Commissioner for Nyasaland13.  This format exaggerated small recent
changes in mortality level at the expense of older, larger ones.
9 Table 1 shows the Crude Death Rates for the camps of the two companies between 1911
and 1940. Mining operations were begun on the Witwatersrand in 1886, some 25 years
before  the  beginning of  copper  mining in  Katanga,  and,  in  that  time,  South African
managers made certain investments in the infrastructure of  housing and health care
which reduced mortality. In the early years of the twentieth century, Crude Death Rates
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there were lower than in Katanga. Indeed, copper company CDRs did not definitively
cross the 30 per thousand threshold until 1929. As far as the Corner House Group was
concerned,  mortality  rates  fell  as  a  combined  result  of  personnel  selection  and
improvements  in  medical  facilities  and  in  personnel  selection  and  improvements  in
medical facilities and in public health. The first major decline shown in Table 1 from
about 30 to below 20 per thousand took place between 1911 and 1913 as a result of a ban
on the recruitment of Africans from north of the Tropic of Capricorn, who experienced
far higher mortality levels than Africans from the temperate zone. For the rest of the
decade,  despite  a  number  of  improvements  brought  by  Orenstein,  mortality  levels
remained in the high teens. Indeed, before 1933, Corner House CDRs never fell as low as
ten per thousand, a rate achieved by Gorgas on the Panama Canal construction in 191214.
In the absence of age specific mortality statistics, part of the higher CDRs could result
from an older work force on the mines, but the contrast is nonetheless striking.
10 As far as the Union Minière is concerned, CDRs reached a disastrous peak of 202 per
thousand in the Spanish Influenza year of 1918 and were as high as 53 in 1926. From that
point onward, however, rates plummeted, crossing those of the Corner House Group in
1931. These latter improvements seem the direct result of the stabilization policies which
included not only lodging workers' nuclear families on the mine sites but also substantial
expenditures on housing, food, and medical care. Let us examine cause of death statistics
to see if we can identify which of the policies is most closely associated with mortality
reduction.
 
Table 2: cause of death by illness corner house
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Union Miniere
Sources: Corner House: A.J. Orenstein, "A Review of the Hygiene Organisation of the Witwatersrand
Gold Mines", in Proceedings of the Third Empire Mining and Metallurgical Congress (London, 1930),
134-148. Union Minière: R. Mouchet, "Documents anatamo-pathologiques sur la nosologie de la main-
d'oeuvre indigène a Elisabethville de 1915 a 1921", Bulletin I.R.C.B. 14, 2 (1943), 422-452; R. Van Nitsen, 
L'Hygiène des travailleurs noirs dans les camps industriels du Haut-Katanga (Bruxelles, 1933).
11 In Katanga as well as the Witwatersrand, pneumonia was the single most important cause
of death both in the early years and around 1930. Both sites experienced a substantial
decline of at least 50 % in the death rate from pneumonia, but even at the latter dates,
these rates were high by Panamanian standards. There the pneumonia death rate fell
from nearly 19 per thousand in 1906 to 11 in 1907 to less the 3 per thousand after 1908.
The newly stabilized work force of the Union Minière was still experiencing a rate twice
that high in 1931.
12 Why did mortality rates from pneumonia remain so high in the African mines? They did
so in part because of the nature of the disease. Pneumonia does not come from a single
bacillus  but  from no less  than eighty strains,  each requiring separate  immunization.
Incubation time is short, and those exposed to the bacillus either resist it in short order
or come down with a serious case15. Another factor appears to have been crowding: as late
as 1930, Orenstein reported that the optimal barracks size was ten to a room but that
some still housed as many as forty16. Van Nitsen suggested in 1933 that no more than
three single men should be housed in an individual dwelling17. Given the significance of
the contribution of pneumonia to total mortality, the Union Minière's higher housing
standards would appear to account for the fall in total mortality in the 1930s, when the
Katanga mines began to approach Panamanian levels. Witwatersrand pneumonia death
rates did not  fall  until the introduction of  sulphonamids in the late 1930s18.  In sum,
pneumonia  mortality  could  be  reduced  through  more  than  one  policy.  This  was
accomplished in Panama and, after 1931, in Katanga, by eliminating crowding, while in
Johannesburg similar results had to await the introduction of broad-spectrum antibiotics.
13 Another set of diseases where different companies practised different policies were the
closely  related  conditions  of  typhoid  and  paratyphoid  fevers.  These  conditions  have
similar symptoms and are transmitted through microscopic fecal particles in water and
food19. As with pneumonia, there is little delay between exposure and illness. Initially,
mortality rates were considerably lower in South Africa than in Katanga. At the Corner
House mines, mortality rates went from 2.8 per thousand per year in 1911 to 1.5 per
thousand in 1928. The Union Minière rate began much higher, at 7.2 per thousand per
year in 1915, but fell to 0 in 1930. Orenstein's staff seemed to consider a small amount of
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typhoid unavoidable. During the twenties, when inoculation provoked negative reactions
in a number of workers, they experimented with an oral vaccine, and then abandoned
efforts altogether20. The Union Minière, by contrast, inoculated all workers before they
came to the mining camps and then gave them annual booster shots21.
14 One final domain for direct comparison is in death from industrial accidents. There the
mortality rates at the Corner House mines vastly exceeded those at the Union Minière. In
the former, mortality from accidents fell from 5.3. per thousand in 1911 to 3.3 in 1928.
Three years later the Katanga rate was 0.1 per thousand.  The most important factor
accounting for this disparity is difference in working conditions. Most of the Katanga
mines were open-cast, so that miners worked in the open air in daylight, while the South
African gold mines were underground and subject  to rockfalls,  explosions of  volatile
gases, and injuries incurred in the darkness.
15 The incidence of three other diseases can not be compared directly from cause-specific
mortality figures but nonetheless reveal differences between the disease pools of the two
work forces. The first of these is tuberculosis which is often seen as a disease of the poor.
Corner House statistics show a substantial decline in TB incidence, dropping from 3.7 per
thousand in 1911 to 0.7 in 192822. Comparable statistics for the early years at the Union
Minière are not available, because Mouchet did not report them as a separate category in
his summary of major causes of death for individual years. He does, however, include
them in his analysis of 421 autopsies which he performed at Elisabethville between 1915
and 1921,  and they amounted to  roughly  one-sixth of  the pneumonia  mortality,  the
equivalent of 2.5 per thousand in 19 1 523. By 1931, the death rate from tuberculosis had
fallen to 0.4 per thousand24.
16 Interpretation  of  these  figures  is  subject  to  considerable  difference  of  opinion.
Distinguished scholars such René Dubos and Randy Packard consider tuberculosis to be a
consequence  of  the  personal  impoverishment  brought  by  capitalism25.  Indeed,  well-
housed,  well-nourished  people  may  harbor  the  tuberculin  bacillus  in  their  systems
without developing an active case. The link between work conditions and tuberculosis,
however, is not necessarily direct. Even in undernourished people, tuberculosis takes a
long time to incubate. I would therefore argue that people died from tuberculosis more as
a result of the state of their metabolisms before they began work on the mines rather
than from conditions  on the  job.  Comparing incidence  rates,  this  would  lead to  the
conclusion  that  Africans  came to  the  Corner  House  gold  mines  in  worse  nutritional
condition than those who came to the Union Minière copper mines.
17 This  hypothesis  is  strengthened  by  the  incidence  of  scurvy,  a  Vitamin  C  deficiency
disorder, in the Corner House causes of death. In 1911, scurvy caused fully two percent of
the total deaths – a rate of 0.7 per thousand per year – which fell to 0.1 per thousand a
year  in  1928.  Although  Mouchet  characterizes  African  workers  from  the  villages  as
undernourished (and malarial), scurvy does not appear as a cause of death in either the
early years or the 1930s. Thus, one might argue that Africans from South Africa and the
High Commission territories were, in the early twentieth century, more likely to suffer
from diseases of malnutrition than Africans from the Belgian Congo – a regularity which
may be well linked to the expropriation of land by South African settlers.
18 Bacillary dysentery, by contrast, was a far more serious killer in tropical Katanga than in
the  sub-tropical  Transvaal.  In  1915,  it  produced  an  annual  death  rate  of  17.6  per
thousand, higher than pneumonia and accounting for nearly a third of all deaths. By 1931,
its death rate had fallen to 0.6 per thousand. Corner House records do not provide a
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separate listing for bacillary dysentery, although Crown Mines reported a 1912 death rate
of 0.9 per thousand. It would appear that bacillary dysentery was a far greater threat to
Union  Minière  workers  than  to  those  at  the  Corner  House  group.  This  comparison,
however, should not be taken as definitive, because it was often classed with typhoid and
paratyphoid fevers  as  an enteric  fever.  Nonetheless,  a  higher  incidence of  dysentery
would not be surprising in a tropical climate. Even there, however, its incidence is not
inevitable; people can be protected from its rapid onset through a combination of clean
water, washing hands, food, and eating utensils. Conditions would be especially bad in
areas of dense population.
19 In  summary,  both  the  Corner  House  Group  mines  and  those  of  the  Union  Minière
presented  dangers  to  the  Africans  who  worked  in  them.  Both  companies  made
considerable advances in the care of their workers between the early 1910s and the 1930s.
Despite top of the line medical expertise, both groups knew that they were doing less
than an optimal job in protecting the health of their African workers. For the first twenty
years of their existence, mortality rates in the Union Minière camps were far higher than
those in the Corner House Camps, a condition not to be advertised. Even in the latter,
however, death rates in 1928 were still higher than those prevailing twenty years earlier
in the Panama Canal Zone. The failure was not so much one of medical technology as the
unwillingness to spend sums necessary to clean up the mines as microenvironments.
Mining managers  were willing to  spend money to  improve the productivity  of  their
respective work forces, but reducing African mortality was not their highest priority.
Even the Panama black mortality rates were four times as high as those experienced by
whites working on the Canal26.
20 These choices were a novelty in the history of both medicine and industry. By 1905, the
consequences of  the germ theory of  disease were beginning to affect  the practise of
medicine in that  the expenditure of  money could produce more effect  health care27.
Managers, who had long realized that the output of their work forces depended at least in
part on their health, were now confronted with deciding exactly how much to spend. In
colonial Africa, as in the Panama Canal Zone, managers made two decisions: to spend
relatively large sums on their European staffs and smaller sums on Africans. The gap
between European and African care  frequently  depended on the  processes  by  which
companies  allocated their  resources.  In order to understand improvements  in health
care, then, we need to learn more about these budgetary procedures.
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ABSTRACTS
En comparant les changements intervenus dans les causes de décès au sein de deux des plus
grandes compagnies minières d'Afrique, il est possible de mieux cerner les caractéristiques des
forces productives et les différences dans les politiques médicales de ces compagnies. Tant le
"Corner House Group" de Witwatersrand que l'Union Minière du Katanga ont été réticents à
rendre public les niveaux de mortalité parmi leurs travailleurs africains et les causes de décès de
ceux-ci.  Cet  article  tentera  d'analyser  les  données  statistiques  que  l'on  peut  trouver  dans
quelques  publications  peu  répandues.  Ces  données  permettront  de  mieux  comprendre  les
conséquences sanitaires des premières étapes du processus d'industrialisation de l'Afrique.
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